Right when our old NUC5 died, its replacement had been delivered and brought online – a new Intel NUC12 Enthusiast, also known as the NUC12SNKi72 (I work at Intel, but even I find that name a bit obtuse). This is a seriously fast machine in a fairly compact package, even though admittedly not as small as the old NUC5. On the other hand, as a machine with an ambition to be a replacement for a dedicated gaming PC, it sports a dedicated graphics card and not just the integrated graphics typical for the classic NUCs.Continue reading “The NUC12 Enthusiast”
There have been quite a few security exploits and covert channels based on timing measurements in recent years. Some examples include Spectre and Meltdown, Etienne Martineau’s technique from Def Con 23, the technique by Maurice et al from NDSS 2017, and attacks on crypto algorithms by observing the timing of execution. There are many more examples, and it is clear that measuring time, in particular in order to tell cache hits and cache misses apart, is a very useful primitive. Thus, it seems to make sense to make it harder for software to measure time, by reducing the precision of or adding jitter to timing sources. But it seems such attempts are rather useless in practice.
[Updated 2018-01-29 with a note on ARC SEM110-120 processors]
Continue reading “Timing Measurements and Security”